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Abstract
Recent experiments revealed that the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster has a dedicated mechanism for forgetting: blocking
the G-protein Rac leads to slower and activating Rac to faster forgetting. This active form of forgetting lacks a satisfactory
functional explanation. We investigated optimal decision making for an agent adapting to a stochastic environment where
a stimulus may switch between being indicative of reward or punishment. Like Drosophila, an optimal agent shows
forgetting with a rate that is linked to the time scale of changes in the environment. Moreover, to reduce the odds of
missing future reward, an optimal agent may trade the risk of immediate pain for information gain and thus forget faster
after aversive conditioning. A simple neuronal network reproduces these features. Our theory shows that forgetting in
Drosophila appears as an optimal adaptive behavior in a changing environment. This is in line with the view that forgetting
is adaptive rather than a consequence of limitations of the memory system.
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Introduction
Drosophila melanogaster forgets [1,2]. In itself this is unremarkable
because forgetting as a behavioral phenomenon appears in any
adaptive system of limited capacity; storing new associations will
lead to interference with existing memories. Forgetting, in this
sense, is just the flip side of learning. When capacity is not an issue,
forgetting may nevertheless be caused by a useful mechanism: one
that keeps a low memory load and thus prevents a slowdown of
retrieval [3,4]. Consequently, capacity or retrieval limitations lie at
the heart of standard theories of non-pathological forgetting [5,6],
which focus on interference and decay explanations. Alternatively,
forgetting has been proposed to be an adaptive strategy that has
evolved in response to the demands of a changing environment
[7]. It is the latter explanation that seems to apply to Drosophila
where the experimental evidence suggests that the cause under-
lying forgetting is an active process which is modulated by the
learning task and not by internal constraints of the memory
system; in particular in olfactory conditioning tasks, reversal
learning leads to faster forgetting [8] whereas spaced training leads
to slower forgetting compared to single or massed training [9].
Further, forgetting in Drosophila seems rather idiosyncratic in that
aversive conditioning is forgotten approximately twice as quickly
as appetitive conditioning [10,11].
In psychology, the term forgetting commonly refers in ‘‘to the
absence of expression of previously properly acquired memory in
situations that normally cause such expression.’’ ([6]; see also [12]).
Similarly, in conditioning experiments, one speaks of forgetting,
when the conditioned stimulus fails to evoke the conditioned
response at some point after successful conditioning [8,13].
In the basic protocol for behavioral studies of memory in Drosophila
[1] a group of flies is placed into a tube for conditioning. There the
flies are exposed to a specific odor and the exposure is paired with a
reinforcer (sugar or electrical shock). Having experienced the pairing
once or multiple times, the flies are removed from the conditioning
tube. After a predefined delay time, the group is placed into the
middle of a second, elongated tube for assessment. One side of the
elongated tube is baited with the conditioned odor and, after a while,
the fraction of flies is determined which exhibit the conditioned
response by comparing the number of flies which are closer to the
baited side of the tube with the number of flies closer to the un-baited
side. The setup allows to measure memory performance (c.f. Fig. 1
D), i.e. expression of the conditioned response, as function of the
delay time and of the conditioning protocol (e.g. magnitude of
reinforcement, number of pairings). To check for bias in the setup,
one typically in addition uses a second odor as a control which was
not paired with a reinforcer.
That Drosophila has a dedicated mechanism to control forgetting
was convincingly demonstrated by Shuai et al. [8] and Berry et al.
[2]. Inhibition of the small G-protein Rac leads to slower decay of
memory, extending it from a few hours to more than one day [8].
Conversely, elevated Rac activity leads to faster forgetting [8].
Similar results were achieved by modulation of a small subset of
Dopamine neurons [2]. Stimulating these neurons leads to faster
forgetting after aversive and appetitive conditioning, while
silencing these neurons leads to slower forgetting [2].
Given the importance of decision making, it appears unlikely
that forgetting in Drosophila is a behavioral trait which is
maladaptive in an ecological sense. Hence we investigated what
generic model of the environment would justify the observed
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forgetting and in particular the asymmetry between aversive and
appetitive conditioning. For this we mathematically determined
optimal decision making strategies in environments with different
associations between stimulus and reinforcement.
Results
Basic model of decision making in a changing
environment
For our model we assumed a simplified scenario where the
conditioning pertains directly to the appetitive reaction. In
particular, depending on the state of the environment, approach-
ing the odor can lead to reward (R~1) or punishment (R~{1)
but it can also result in no reinforcement (R~0) (Fig. 1). Fleeing
the odor, i.e the aversive reaction, never leads to reinforcement
(R~0). An agent (fruit fly), whose goal is to maximize
reinforcement, chooses between the appetitive and aversive
reaction depending on past experience. To model the non-
deterministic behavior observed in the experiments we assume
that the two available behavioral options involve different costs of
responding. These costs of responding, however, fluctuate from
trial to trial causing no bias on average. For instance, a fly which
happens to find itself to the right of the group initially could well
have a smaller cost of responding for staying on this side of the
assessment tube on this trial. More generally, the stochastic costs of
responding can be seen as incorporating all other factors that also
influence the behavior but do not depend on the past experiences
that involve the conditioned stimulus. The total reward received
by the agent is the external reinforcement (R) minus the cost of
responding. Our agent takes this into account in decision making,
and so the costs of responding result in trial to trial fluctuation in
the behavior. Whether the appetitive reaction results in
R~1,{1 or 0 depends on the state of the environment. This
state changes slowly over time (according to a Markov chain, see
Methods and Fig. 1A). So when the appetitive reaction results in
R~1 on one trial, the same outcome is likely on an immediately
subsequent trial, but as time goes by the odds increase that the
appetitive reaction results in R~0 or even punishment.
The agent maintains a belief about the environmental
state
If the agent knew the environmental state, the best policy would
be simple: choose the appetitive (aversive) reaction if the
environmental state is rewarding (punishing). Typically however,
Figure 1. Agent acting in a changing environment. A The
environmental state changes stochastically with rates h between being
rewarding, neutral or punishing. Unless mentioned otherwise, we
choose hpn~hrn~ 415 and hnp~hnr~
1
30. B Based on a policy (with
forgetting, without forgetting) which may depend on past observations
of the environmental state and current costs of responding, an agent
shows the appetitive reaction (upward arrow) or the aversive reaction
(downward arrow). The stochastic costs (i.i.d. with an exponential
distribution with scale parameter s) for the appetitive/aversive reaction
are shown above/below the white line. An agent with a policy that
involves forgetting accumulates more reward than an agent without
forgetting or immediate forgetting. C In an emulation of a classical
conditioning experiment, the agent experiences a defined environ-
mental state, and after a waiting period of length t the agent has to
react according to the internal policy. D Different policies lead to
different outcomes in classical conditioning experiments. Shown is the
fraction of agents choosing the conditioned response (conditioned
resp.) at time t after conditioning for agents subject to individual costs
of responding.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003640.g001
Author Summary
The dominant perception of forgetting in science and
society is that it is a nuisance in achieving better memory
performance. However, recent experiments in the fruit fly
show that the forgetting rate is biochemically adapted to
the environment, raising doubts that slower forgetting per
se is a desirable feature. Here we show that, in fact, optimal
behavior in a stochastically changing environment requires
a forgetting rate that is adapted to the time constant of
the changes. The fruit fly behavior is compatible with the
classical optimality criterion of choosing actions that
maximize future rewards. A consequence of future reward
maximization is that negative experiences that lead to
timid behavior should be quickly forgotten in order to not
miss rewarding opportunities. In economics this is called
‘‘minimization of opportunity costs’’, and the fruit fly
seems to care about it: punishment is forgotten faster than
reward. Forgetting as a trait of optimality can further
explain the different memory performances for multiple
training sessions with varying inter-session intervals, as
observed in a wide range of species from flies to humans.
These aspects suggest to view forgetting as a dimension of
adaptive behavior that is tuned to the environment to
maximize subjective benefits.
A Normative Theory of Forgetting
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the agent does not know the actual environmental state but, at
best, maintains a belief about it (see Fig. 2A and Methods). In our
model, the belief consists of the probabilities br, bn and bp to
receive rewarding, neutral or punishing reinforcement, respective-
ly, after selecting the appetitive reaction. Geometrically, the belief
can be represented as a position in a 2-dimensional belief space
that stepwise changes after the appetitive reaction and thus gaining
new information about the current environmental state and
otherwise drifts towards an equilibrium (forgetting), see Fig. 2B
(note that, since the three probabilities sum to one, the probability
of the neutral state can be computed given the probabilities of the
rewarding and punishing state, i.e. bn~1{br{bp).
If e.g. a fly gets punished, the probability bp to be punished
again on the next trial is high (initial point of red trajectory in
Fig. 2B). If subsequently the fly chooses the aversive reaction, the
belief will drift towards a stationary value (end point of red
trajectory in Fig. 2B). We assume that the agent has implicit
knowledge, e.g. gathered by experience or through genetic
encoding, about the transition rates of the environmental state.
Acting according to a greedy policy leads to forgetting
Based on belief values and costs of responding one may define
different policies. A greedy policy selects the appetitive reaction if
the agent believes that reward is more probable than punishment
and costs of responding are equal for both actions, i.e. br§bp
(Fig. 2C top, middle). If costs for one reaction are larger than for
the other, the region in the belief space favoring this higher-cost
reaction becomes smaller (Fig. 2C top, left and right). Immediately
after conditioning, an agent has a strong belief that the
environment is still in the same state as during conditioning.
Thus, if the greedy policy determines action selection, an agent
most likely chooses the conditioned response. As the belief drifts
towards the stationary point, the stochastic costs of responding
gain more influence on the decision making and thus an agent is
more likely to have already forgotten the conditioning, i.e. the
agent is more likely to choose the opposite of the conditioned
response. We call this policy ‘‘greedy’’, because it maximizes
reward if only one choice is made but it is not necessarily optimal
with respect to gaining future rewards. Technically, the greedy
policy is equivalent to the optimal future discounted policy with
discount factor c~0, i.e. the policy that neglects future rewards.
Dependence of the forgetting curve on parameter
choices
In order to conveniently analyze the forgetting behavior under
the greedy policy for different choices of the environmental
parameters hrn,hpn,hnr and hnp (Fig. 1A), we use a re-parametri-
zation with the ‘‘probability of the neutral state’’ rn and the
‘‘average reward’’ m~rr{rp, where rx denotes the stationary
state probability of state x (see Methods for the relationship
between r and h). Changing the probability of the neutral state rn
has almost no effect on the forgetting curve (Fig. 3A, solid vs.
dashed line). Increasing the average reward has the consequence
that in the stationary state more agents select the appetitive
reaction than the aversive reaction (Fig. 3A, solid vs. dotted line).
The speed of forgetting a conditioned state (p, n or r) is determined
by the rate of transitioning away from this state. Fig. 3A (solid vs.
dash-dotted line) shows the effect of changing the rate hrn, whose
inverse is equal to the average number of timesteps the
environment spends in the rewarding state: forgetting is faster
for a larger rate hrn. The variance of the costs of responding
determines the impact of the costs of responding on decision
making. For large variance the forgetting curve is closer to 0.5
than for small variance, since for large variance it is more likely
that the costs of responding have a strong impact on decision
making (Fig. 3B).
Acting according to a provident policy leads to faster
forgetting after aversive conditioning than after
appetitive conditioning
While the difference in forgetting speed after appetitive and
aversive forgetting could be a consequence of different transition
rates hrn and hpn, such a difference also arises if these rates are
equal but the agent uses a provident policy, i.e. a policy that also
takes into account future rewards. In the long run the provident
policy is superior to the greedy policy (Fig. 4B). We therefore
determined numerically a policy which approximately maximizes
the reward rate, i.e. the total reward accumulated over a long
period divided by the length of this period (see Methods). The
Figure 2. Belief and policy of an agent acting in a changing
environment. A The belief about the environmental state b(t) may
influence the choice of the appetitive or aversive reaction. Only after
the appetitive reaction, the agent gains new information about the true
state of the environment. The belief b(t) and the agents knowledge
about the transition probabilities of the environmental state combined
with potentially new information determines the new belief b(tz1). B
The starting point of the arrows is a belief found by choosing the
appetitive reaction once and receiving reward (green), punishment
(red) or no reinforcement (blue). If the agent always chooses the
aversive reaction thereafter, the belief drifts to the stationary state
along the trajectories shown by the arrows. Possible belief states
b~(br,bn,bp) with brzbnzbp~1 can be represented as a point in the
‘‘belief space’’ (gray shaded triangle). C The regions in the belief space
favoring the appetitive reaction (dark shading, upward arrow) over the
aversive reaction (bright shading, downward arrow) depend on the
policy and the costs of responding. The provident policy (lowest row) is
biased towards the appetitive reaction. A larger cost for the aversive
reaction than for the appetitive reaction (left column) decreases the
region of the aversive reaction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003640.g002
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resulting policy is such that there are beliefs for which the
appetitive reaction is chosen, even when the probability of
punishment is larger than the probability of reward, i.e. bpwbr,
and the costs of responding are equal for both actions (Fig. 2C
bottom, middle). The reason for this becomes clearer when we
look at what economists call the opportunity cost, i.e. the
additional gain that has not been harvested because of missing to
choose the (often by hindsight) better option [14]. For the
appetitive reaction, the agent’s opportunity cost is given by the
potentially lower cost for the aversive reaction. But for the
aversive reaction, the agent’s opportunity cost is not only the
potentially lower cost for the appetitive reaction but also the lack
of further information about the actual environmental state. This
information is required for best exploitation in future trials.
Assume, for instance, that at some point in time the agent
believes that punishment is slightly more probable than reward
and therefore sticks to the aversive reaction. Now, if the actual
environmental state would be rewarding, the agent would not
only miss the current reward but also misses subsequent rewards
that could potentially be harvested while the state is still
rewarding. When taking this opportunity cost into account, the
agent will choose the appetitive reaction despite the belief state
slightly favoring the aversive reaction. For an external observer
this optimal choice behavior appears as a faster forgetting of the
aversive memory. In short, the asymmetry in forgetting after
aversive and appetitive conditioning (Fig. 4) arises because
choosing the appetitive reaction is always informative about the
current environmental state whereas choosing the aversive
reaction is not.
A simple mechanistic implementation results in close to
optimal behavior
The probabilistic calculations needed to derive the optimal
provident behavior can be quite involved. We do not suggest that
there is a neuronal circuitry in Drosophila which actually does these
calculations. Yet it is interesting to note that a much simpler
mechanistic decision making model already results in close to
optimal behavior (Fig. 4B). This simple model allows an
interpretation of the variables as synaptic strengths from odor
sensitive neurons to decision neurons (Fig. 4C). In the absence of
odor and behavioral feedback the synaptic strengths decay with
different time scales towards a stationary level: decay is faster for
synapses targeting the ‘‘avoid’’ neurons than for the ‘‘approach’’
neurons. One could speculate that the speed of this decay is
governed by e.g. the concentration of Rac [8] or dopamine [2].
Drosophila adapts to changing environmental time scales
So far we have assumed that the transition rates between the
environmental states are fixed. This is not an assumption Drosophila
seems to make and in fact, would be an unrealistic model of the
environment. The experiments by Tully et al. [9] show that
forgetting depends not only on the number of conditioning trials
but also on their frequency. In particular, forgetting is slower when
the same number of learning trials is spaced out over a longer
period of time. Spaced training is more informative about the
environment being in a slowly changing mode than the temporally
compressed massed training. Furthermore, reversal training
during which in fast succession an odor is aversively, neutral and
again aversively conditioned [8] results in faster forgetting and is
informative about a fast changing environment. So the observed
behavior provides rather direct evidence that adaptation in
Drosophila does indeed take non-stationarity into account.
Extended model with slow and fast transitions matches
the observed behavior for different conditioning
protocols
To include adaptation as a response to changing transition
rates, we extended our model by a slowly varying meta variableM
which can either be in state ‘‘fast change’’ or ‘‘slow change’’
(Fig. 5A). The dynamics of the meta variable M is governed by a
Markov process with small transition rates. In state ‘‘fast change’’,
the environmental reward state X changes more rapidly than in
state ‘‘slow change’’. In this setting, an optimal agent maintains a
belief about both the environmental reward state X and the
‘‘hidden’’ state M that sets the time scale of the changes in X .
Spaced training increases the belief that the environment is in a
slowly changing mode, whereas reversal learning leads to a strong
belief about the environment being in the fast changing mode. The
resulting greedy-optimal behavior is in qualitative agreement with
the known behavior after spaced, massed and reversal learning
(Fig. 5B) as observed for flies [8,9], honey bees [15], pigeons [13],
and humans [16].
Figure 3. Dependence of the forgetting curves on the model parameters. A Left: The stationary belief state in the absence of observations
(indicated by dots) moves along the direction of the arrows for increasing probability of the neutral state rn or increasing average reward m. How fast
the belief drifts towards the stationary state after receiving reward depends on the parameter hrn that controls the ‘‘timescale of changes’’. Right:
Changing the probability of the neutral state rn only marginally affects the forgetting curve (solid and dashed line). A smaller rate of changes hrn
leads to slower forgetting (dash-dotted curve). A positive average reward m leads to a higher fraction of agents choosing the appetitive reaction,
which is here the conditioned response (dotted curve). B For a large variance of costs of responding (curve with scale parameter of the exponential
distribution s~1) there are some agents that do not exhibit the conditioned response immediately after conditioning, since the costs of the
conditioned response are too large. If the variance of the costs of responding is small (curve with s~ 1144), most agents choose the conditioned
response until their belief gets close to the stationary belief state.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003640.g003
A Normative Theory of Forgetting
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Discussion
We demonstrated that forgetting appears when an agent, subject
to costs of responding, acts optimally in an environment with non-
stationary stimulus-reinforcement associations. Based on reward
maximization in a non-stationary environment, which is a reasonable
objective not only for the fruit fly but for other species as well, our
normative theory of forgetting includes an asymmetry in forgetting
speed after aversive and appetitive conditioning and an adaptation of
forgetting speed after spaced, massed and reversal learning. The
asymmetry is the result of an economically optimal provident policy,
which forages not only for immediate reward but also for information
required for future exploitation. The adaptation of forgetting rate
after spaced, massed and reversal learning is a consequence of the
agents estimation of the current rate of environmental changes.
That costs of responding influence the action selection is an
assumption which is in agreement with test-retest experiments
[9,11,17]. In these classical conditioning experiment the flies are
grouped according to whether they choose the conditioned
response or not. Both groups are immediately retested to examine
whether the flies stick to their decision. The outcome is: they do
not. An equal fraction of flies chooses the conditioned response in
both retest groups and this fraction is the same as in the first test
containing all flies. This suggests that all flies maintain traces of the
conditioning but that also other factors influence the choice in a
stochastic way. Similarly, in our model the belief is a sufficient
statistic of the past experiences that involve the conditioned
stimulus and the stochastic costs of responding account for other
factors that influence the choice.
A key assumption in our normative explanation of the differential
forgetting in Drosophila is that the relationship between conditioned
stimulus and reinforcement is non-stationary. Now, if this relation-
ship were completely stationary, it would not need to be learned by
the phenotype because it would already have been learned by the
genotype, i.e. in this case the stimulus would be an unconditioned
stimulus. Hence, from an evolutionary perspective, our assumption
is close to being a truism. Nevertheless, many biological models of
reinforcement learning have, for the sake of simplicity, assumed a
stationary stimulus-reinforcement relationship [18,19].
Experiments and models with non-stationary stimulus-rein-
forcement associations have suggested, similar to our findings, that
in a more volatile environment the learning should be faster [20–
24]. However, faster learning does not unconditionally imply faster
forgetting. The asymmetry in forgetting speed after appetitive and
aversive conditioning additionally requires an evaluation of the
behavioral relevance of a specific memory content. Since the
aversive reaction is not informative about the current state of
association, aversive conditioning should be forgotten faster than
appetitive conditioning.
Finding the optimal policy in an environment with a non-
stationary stimulus-reinforcement relationship, as considered here,
is computationally involving. As we have shown, however,
Figure 4. Asymmetry of behavior after aversive and appetitive conditioning. A An agent with a provident policy shows faster forgetting
after aversive conditioning (red curve) than after appetitive conditioning (green curve). The boxes mark the behavior of the approximative model in
C. B The total reward collected in free runs of 105 time bins (compare to Fig. 1B) is larger for the provident policy than for the greedy policy. Plotted
are mean and s.e.m. for 40 trials. C Similar performances are obtained with a simple, approximative implementation of the optimal strategy with
synaptic strengths wap and wav connecting an odor detecting neuron (o) to action neurons ‘‘approach’’ (ap) and ‘‘avoid’’ (av). In the absence of any
stimulus (odor) the synaptic strengths decay with different time constants for the approximative provident policy and with the same time constants
for the approximative greedy policy. When an odor is present, the synaptic strengths change in a Hebbian way in the case of reward and in an anti-
Hebbian way in the case of punishment, i.e. wap/wav increase/decrease for reward and decrease/increase for punishment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003640.g004
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approximately optimal decision making is still possible with a
simplified neuronal model using experience induced synaptic
updates. This model incorporates forgetting in the decay time
constant of the synaptic strengths. As the parameters describing
the changing environment are assumed to be constant across
generations, the neuronal architecture and the forgetting rates can
be considered to be genetically encoded.
Since the work of Ebbinghaus [25] on the forgetting rate of non-
sense syllables and the observation of Jenkins and Dallenbach [26]
that sleep between learning and recalling reduces forgetting, cognitive
psychologists debate about the role of natural decay and interference
in explaining forgetting [5]. While interference based explanations
are favored by many [5,12], Hardt et al. [6] recently advocated active
processes behind decay-driven forgetting. They suggested a memory
system that engages in promiscuous encoding and uses a flexible
mechanism to remove irrelevant information later, mostly during
sleep phases. In their view, different forgetting rates are a sign of such
a flexible removal mechanism. But why do biological organisms need
to actively remove irrelevant memories at all? Popular answers so far
implicitly assumed that forgetting is ultimately the result of some
limitation of the memory system, for instance, limited storage
capacity, a limit on the acceptable read-out time for the memory or a
decay of the biological substrate similar to unused muscles atrophy
[6,27]. In our model, however, forgetting does not result from a
memory limitation, but emerges as an adaptive feature of the memory
system to optimally cope with a changing environment while
accounting for the relevance of different memory contents.
Methods
Basic model of the environment
In time bin t an odor can be associated with one of three
environmental states: Xt~r (reward), Xt~n (neutral), Xt~p
(punishment). The time-discrete dynamics of the environmental
state is given by a Markov Chain with state space X~fr,n,pg and
transition probabilities hrn~hpn~4=15 and hnr~hnp~1=30,
where hxy~P(Xtz1~yDXt~x) for x,y[X . For simplicity we did
not include direct transitions between the rewarding and
punishing state, i.e. hrp~hpr~0. Including them would also allow
for a behavior where the preference switches from the conditioned
response to the opposite of the conditioned response before
reaching the stationary state. The stationary distribution of this
Markov chain, satisfying the self-consistency equation
ry~
P
x hxyrx, is given by rr~Z
{1hnrhpn~rp~Z
{1hrnhnp~
1=10 and rn~Z
{1hrnhpn~8=10, where Z~hnrhpnzhrnhnpz
hrnhpn.
External reinforcement signal
In each time bin t the agent has two behavioral options:
approach the odor (At~ap) or avoid the odor (At~av). If the
agent avoids, a neutral reinforcement signal Rt~0 is always
returned. If the agent approaches, the external reinforcement
signal depends on the environmental state: there will always be a
positive signal Rt~1 if Xt~r, always a negative signal Rt~{1 if
Xt~p and if the odor is associated with the neutral state (Xt~n),
the agent will stochastically get a neutral signal Rt~0 with
probability 0.99, while with probability 0.005 the agent will get a
positive or a negative reinforcement signal. Positive and negative
reinforcement signals during the neutral state are included to
model situations, where reward or punishment depends on odor
unrelated factors. For further use we summarize the information in
this paragraph in the probabilities qaxr~P(R
t~rDAt~a,Xt~x),
with non-zero entries qav,n,0~1, qap,r,1~1, qap,p,{1~1 and
qap,n,0~0:99, qap,n,1~0:005, qap,n,{1~0:005.
Belief
The agent maintains a belief btx~P(X
t~xDA1~a1,R1~r1,
. . . ,At~at,Rt~rt) over the current environmental state Xt given
past reinforcement r1,r2, . . . ,rt and actions a1,a2, . . . ,at. The
belief state is updated by Bayesian filtering
bty~
1
Z
qatyrt
X
x[X
hxyb
t{1
x , ð1Þ
with normalization Z~
P
x,y[X qatyrthxyb
t{1
x . We use the abbre-
viation bt~tar(bt{1) to denote the update of the belief bt{1 given
action a and reinforcement signal r.
Costs of responding
We modeled costs of responding with exponentially distributed
and uncorrelated random variables jap and jav with parameter
s~ 112, i.e. the probability density function of ja is given by
p(ja)~
1
s exp({DjaD=s) if jav0 and p(ja)~0 otherwise. This
distribution has mean{s and standard deviation s. We assumed,
that the agent receives an effective reward, which is a sum of the
external reinforcement signal and the momentary cost of
responding for the action chosen. During decision making, the
agent knows the costs of responding for both actions but only has
an expectation of the external reinforcement signal.
Greedy policy: Maximization of immediate reward
If the goal is to maximize immediate reward, the agent’s policy
depends on the expected return in the next step
E1a (b
t)~
P
x,r rqaxrb
t
x, which for action ap can be simplified to
Figure 5. Behavior of agents that estimate the time scale of
non-stationarity. A In an extended model the rate of change
depends on a slowly changing meta variableM , which can be in a slow
or fast state. B As observed in experiments with Drosophila, our model
agents show slowest forgetting after spaced training and fastest
forgetting of the last association after reversal training. In our model,
this result appears as a consequence of spaced training being most
informative about slow transitions, whereas reversal training is most
informative about fast transitions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003640.g005
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E1ap(b)~br{bp and for action av is always zero, i.e. E
1
av(b)~0.
Including costs of responding, the policy that maximizes imme-
diate reward selects the action for which E1a (b)zja is maximal.
Provident policy: Maximization of reward rate
A canonical choice of the objective to be maximized by a
provident policy is the reward rate, i.e.
lim
T??
1
T
XT
t~1
rt(p)
with expected reward rt(p) in time bin t when acting according to
policy p. We approximately determined the policy which
maximizes the reward rate by two methods: dynamic program-
ming and linear programming on a quantized space.
Dynamic Programming allows to find a policy that maximizes
the future discounted values
V?(p,b)~
X?
t~1
ctrt(p,b),
with discount factor c[½0,1) and expected reward rt(p,b) in time
bin t after starting in belief state b and acting according to policy p.
For finite state spaces and c sufficiently close to 1 a policy that
maximizes future discounted reward also maximizes the reward
rate [28]. Without costs of responding one could directly apply the
Incremental Pruning algorithm [29] to find a policy that
maximizes the future discounted values. Here we derive dynamical
programming in the presence of costs of responding.
Dynamic programming proceeds by iteratively constructing
optimal finite-horizon values Vnz1(b)~maxp V
nz1(p,b)~
T ½Vn(b)$ for some operator T . Assume that we have the
horizon-n policy np that maximizes the future discounted values
of an episode of length n. The horizon-n policy consists of
instructions for each step in the episode np~fpn,pn{1, . . . ,p1g,
where ps tells which action to take at the s-th step before the end of
the episode, given belief b and costs of responding jav and jap. To
construct the horizon-nz1 policy we need to extend the horizon-n
policy by the instruction for the first step, i.e. the nz1-th step
before the end of the episode. Without considering the costs of
responding in the first step, the expected future discounted values
for choosing action a are given by
Enz1a (b)~E
1
a (b)zc
X
r
qar(b)V
n(tar(b)), ð2Þ
where qar(b)~
P
x qaxrbx and the value function V
n(b) is given by
(we will use the indicator function x, given by x½e$~1 if e is true
and x½e$~0 otherwise):
Vn(b)~ð
djapdjavp(jap)p(jav) x E
n
ap(b)zjapwEnav(b)zjav
h i
Enap(b)zjap
" #n
zx Enap(b)zjapƒEnav(b)zjav
h i
Enav(b)zjav
$ %o
:
With the change of variables jav.j~jav{jap, the resulting
probability density function p(j)~ 12s exp({DjD=s) for j[R (La-
place probability density), and the abbreviations z~
(Enap(b){E
n
av(b)), c(z)~
Ð
djp(j)x j§z½ $ and d(z)~ Ð djp(j)x j½
§z$j, we get
Vn(b)~
ð
djapdjp(jap)p(j) x E
n
ap(b)wEnav(b)zj
h i
Enap(b)zjap
" #n
zx Enap(b)ƒEnav(b)zj
h i
Enav(b)zjzjap
$ %o
~
ð
djapp(jap)jap
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{~{s
=tz
ð
djp(j) xf Enap(b)wEnav(b)zj
h i
E1ap(b)
zx Enap(b)ƒEnav(b)zj
h i
Enav(b)zj
$ %o
~{szEnap(b){c(z)zzd(z):
ð3Þ
In the same manner we find the value function Vnz1(b), which
depends through Enz1a (b) on V
n(b) (see Eq. 2)
Vnz1(b)~T ½Vn(b)$~{szEnz1ap (b){c(z)zzd(z), ð4Þ
where now z~(Enz1ap (b){E
nz1
av (b)).
Due to the discount factor cv1 this recursion will eventually
converge. In practice we will stop after N iterations and define the
policy %p~pN , which approximates the future discounted policy.
Note that in contrast to the finite horizon policies np the policy %p
is stationary: in a sequential setting there is no end of an episode
on which the policy may depend.
The number of terms in a naive implementation of Vn(b) grows
exponentially with n. Without costs of responding the exponential
growth can sometimes be prohibited by Incremental Pruning [29].
With costs of responding we are not aware of a way to prevent
exponential growth. In Fig. 4 we approximated the stationary
policy %p by taking the policy after 5 iteration with discount factor
c~0:9, i.e. %p&p5. Since it is not clear whether for this choice of
discount factor and number of iterations the resulting policy is a
good approximation of the reward rate maximizing policy, we
compared the result of dynamic programming with the policy
obtained by linear programming on a quantized belief space.
For finite state and action space Markov Decision Processes
linear programming can be used to find a policy that maximizes
the reward rate [30,31]. In our case, the policies act on the
continuous space of belief states b and cost of responding
differences j. Analogous to the finite state space problem, the
optimization problem could be formulated as: find functions
c%a(b,j) that implicitly define the policy [30] and satisfy
c%a(b,j)~arg max
ca(b,j)
X
a
ð
db djca(b,j)ra(b,j)
with ca(b,j) subject to ca(b,j)§0Va,b,j and
X
a
ð
db djca(b,j)~1 and
X
a
ca(b’,j’)~
X
a
ð
db djca(b,j)pa(b,j,b’,j’)
where ra(b,j) denotes the expected reward for action a, belief state
b and costs of responding differences j and pa(b,j,b’,j’) denotes
the probability density to transition from b and j to b’ and j’ given
( )
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action a. A straightforward approach is to quantize the belief space
and space of cost of responding differences, replace the integrals by
sums and find through linear programming an approximation to
the reward rate maximizing policy. We quantized the two
dimensional belief simplex fb[R3DPx bx~1,bx§0,Vxg on a
square lattice with different lattice spacings. Values that did not
fall on lattice points where stochastically assigned to neighboring
lattice points. The space of real valued cost of responding
differences was quantized by segmenting the real line into adjacent
intervals with equal mass of the probability density function. For
each interval the average costs of responding for each action where
computed. Using increasingly finer quantization we estimated the
total reward to be between 600 and 655 for trials of 105 time bins,
which is in agreement with the estimate obtained with dynamic
programming (Fig. 4B provident).
A simple, approximative implementation
In Fig. 4 we demonstrate that also an agent with two uncoupled
low-pass filters can show near to optimal behavior. The agent’s
decision to approach (At~ap) or avoid (At~av) the odor depends
on whether wapzjapwwavzjav, where wa (a~ap or av) are
variables interpretable as synaptic strengths and where ja
represents stochastic input due to costs of responding. The values
of wa decay with different time-constants, in the case of no
feedback, because the agent either stays away or no odor is
present. If the agent approaches the odor and experiences reward,
wap is set to a maximal value, while wav is set to zero; for odor plus
punishment wav is set to a maximal value, while wap is set to zero.
Formally, with the subscript a standing for either ap or av, we get
The parameter ga controls the speed of forgetting, w
0
a sets a
baseline value and wmaxa sets a maximum value. In Fig. 4 the
parameter values where fit to the curves in sub-figure A (approx
provident: gap~0:73, gav~0:65, w
0
ap~0:16, w
0
av~0:00,
wmaxa ~0:70) and to the curves in sub-figure B (approx greedy:
ga~0:73, w
0
a~0:00, w
max
a ~0:68).
Extended model of the environment
To study the behavior of an agent that additionally has to
estimate the rate of change we extended the basic model of the
environment with a meta variable that controls the rate of change
of the environmental state. In time bin t the meta variable can be
in one of two states:Mt~f (fast) orMt~s (slow). The dynamics of
the meta variable is described by a Markov Chain with transition
probabilities hMfs~1=500 and h
M
sf~1=1500. If the meta variable is
in the slow (fast) state the transition parameters of the environ-
mental state are hM~srn ~h
M~s
pn ~8=45, h
M~f
rn ~h
M~f
pn ~8=450 and
hM~snr ~h
M~s
np ~1=45, h
M~f
nr ~h
M~f
np ~1=450. In the extended
model the state space is given by the product space
ff,sg|fr,n,pg and the transition parameters are given by
hE(v,x)(w,y)~h
M
vwh
M~v
xy . The agent maintains a belief about both
the environmental state and the state of transition speed.
Spaced, massed and reversal learning
In spaced training, the agent was aversively conditioned six
times with intermittent waiting periods of 9 time bins. In massed
training, the agent was aversively conditioned in 6 subsequent time
bins. In reversal learning, the agent was exposed to the punishing,
neutral and punishing environmental state in subsequent time
bins. Forgetting curves are shown for the computationally less
involving greedy policy. In order to compare massed with spaced
training we choose a finer time discretization in the extended
model, i.e. 10 time bins in the extended model correspond to 1
time bin in the basic model. In figure 5B the result is plotted in
units of the basic model.
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